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abstract
	
The hypothesis to be verified explains why bodily asceticism is excluded, owing to the
influence of the ideologist, from the system of public health in the structure of a liberal
cratocracy, in which reason is the good of the authority for its own sake. In the structure
of national society, the system of bodily asceticism is raised to the status of community
good. Despite the blocking of the connectivity of the system of bodily asceticism to the
social structure, academic gymnasions survived the collapse of the state. Each of them
independently excused itself with the idealess reason of the market in physical services,
the undoubtedly important reason for the private network of fitness clubs but failed to meet
the expectations of the fraction of the community of scholars who constantly aspire to fulfil
public tasks relevant to the cultural community of the nation. Modernising the system of
bodily asceticism located by the authorities, within the structure of public health, can be
achieved with the participation of both philosophers and teachers of physical culture.
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introduction 

Bodily asceticism in the area of sociology and the philosophy of physical
culture is the subject under consideration in this essay. Asceticism means a
relationship, i.e. referring an activity to its whole; because it is a reference
of the entity to itself, the vector of activity of asceticism is self-referential.
Asceticism is an activity of bodily improvement, and also a spiritual one; the
activities of bodily formation are assigned different meanings depending on
the reasons justifying the meaning of the higher activities. The social role
of an ascetic includes all the activities and relationships established in the
cultural group of the gymnasion – the organizational centre of the physical
culture social system. Bodily asceticism logically precedes every social
relationship. At a macro level it creates the structure of physical culture
as well as the structure of public health, which both potentially sit within
the structure of society as a whole. Depending on the causative-ideological
model of society the structure of physical culture can be validated or
eliminated, transferred into a state of potentiality. The principle of topdown causality used to analyse social reality allows us to understand the
reason why there is no structure of bodily asceticism in the structure of
a liberal-democratic state.

the significance of structuralism 

1. The question of structure belongs in geometry, and the question of both the
natural and observable objects of the structure, to physics – from the word
physis (gr. Φύσις) – denoting natural beings. It could not be otherwise, as it
is known that general ontology, which explains the nature and causality of
being, resolves that objects remain relational beings, whereas relationships
are not self-existent beings. Unobservable objects from which the world is
composed can be recognised by the relations occurring between them, which is
why a physicist can participate indirectly in their exploration. This peculiarity
of the world of natural objects (existing in quantum) has led physicists to
divide the images of the world (and indeed metaphysical approaches) into
epistemological structuralism. Accordingly, relationships which create
structures and contain implicit metaphysical assumptions about the existence
of these unobservable objects as well as ontological structuralism, in which
the world is composed only of relationships [1], are the source of knowledge
of the objective world.
Regardless of, or rather, along with this discussion of physicists and philosophers
of science, mathematical structuralism as used in physical theories leads
to a sensational-sounding (in a traditionally accepted sense) realism of the
metaphysical point of view. According to this, it is considered through “the
search for the true nature of reality”; the mathematical structure is the Physical
World itself (the structure of our physical world is a mathematical structure)
[2], and not, as it has been claimed so far, that mathematical structures (so
successfully studied by physicists) lead to acquiring knowledge of the World’s
Structure. In other words, mathematical structures, by reflecting reality,
remain in “a certain resonance with the structure of reality” [1]. The author
of this way of thinking admits himself that he represents “a quite crazy belief
that our physical world can not only be described mathematically, but that
it actually is mathematics, which makes us self-aware elements of a giant
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mathematical object”. As for Tegmark’s understanding of reality, the physicist
understands it as “the ultimate nature of the external physical world” [2].
With this revolutionarily-sounding ontological view which promises a
revolution of thought in the fundamental meaning of the legitimacy of the
realistic (or more precisely the materialistic) approach in science, we are
dealing in cosmology, and of course in the very heart of quantum physics.
The view of the quantum physicist, who introduces a new order of thought
to transcendental metaphysics, which will have an impact on “all scientific
processes” (as Goswami, the perpetrator of the coup, admits) sounds even
bolder after the adoption of an image of the World “based on the primacy of
consciousness” [3]. Goswami, as every scientific realist, asks himself about
“the nature of reality”, causing amazement when he “orders” quantum physics
to adopt “top-down causality”. In this, the spirituality of quantum dynamics,
or the soul itself, which is a collection of quantum capabilities (having nonlocal and unstructured properties) and which assigns creative potential, is
manifested in the localised structure of the physical body. He does not say
that quantum spirituality provides the body with structure, but only that it
gives life to it locally, while at the same time reincarnating itself. Thus he
does not decide about the idea of a human being’s structure and he does not
reach the conclusions relevant to epistemological structuralists in physics.
They claim that physical reality is “permeated” with mathematical structure
and not (as in the Neoplatonic hypostasis of material beings) that the material
world, which is the final emanation of the spiritual world accessible to human
reason, follows this world, and so, it “emerges” from this world, whatever that
means. Just as in the Christian hypostasis, material corporeality is preceded by
the Logos, which is “at the very beginning” and precedes the physical reality
which “becomes” flesh.
2. I quote these examples concerning the understanding of structuralism in
the mathematical sciences of nature, to draw attention to the human sciences
which are considered a subset in the widely-understood context of natural
science. This is determined, on the one hand, by cosmology, and on the other
hand by quantum physics, which both need to find their confirmation in
anthropological cognition. In the ontological perspective, they have to come
across “the case” of the human being considered as a microcosm: atomistic and
quantum, in which for some the mathematical structures are the expression
of the completion of intelligent design, and for the others a confirmation of
the existence of the Logos of the spiritual world – which precedes physical
reality – and which finds its realignment in the bodily structure. It is as if, by
following the stoics (in particular Heraclitus), they aspire to find in this way of
thinking, which states that immanent rationality is contained in the personal
dimension of man while participating in the Rationality of the universe, and
as the law, directing the course of nature, and which should shape the course
of human actions [4, p. 229].
3. When we ask about society we must bear in mind that it is a rational being,
created by participants in the same activity and always with its own assigned
meaning. Thus by analogy we call the social structure “the social geometry”
and the objects that are relationally bound with each other, “social physics”.
Relationships in social reality do not exist independently of “objects. This
obviously does not rule out the ability to recognise them as separate structures,
www.balticsportscience.com

130

Baltic Journal of Health and Physical Activity 2017;9(2):128-148
Journal of Gdansk University of Physical Education and Sport in Gdansk
e-ISSN 2080-9999

but in no way can learning about society be reduced solely to “network links”.
A sociologist must ask not only who starts the network, but also what reason
justifies the desire for its realisation. He must ask about the reasons for its
creation, or as defined by a metaphysician, about the tertium comparationis,
which is the basis of the created relationship, and understood as the third
component in the relationship between objects: the subject, the end point
and the rationale [5, p. 127]. The sociologist must ask about culture, as the
supreme regulator of social structure, in which this reason, as a notion of
good, forms the core of the normative reality of thought. This is not because
the objects of social reality are observable (as opposed to objects in the field
of quantum physics), but because it is ontologically impossible that society
is limited only to relationships, and thus to the reality of existing outside
the objects correlated with each other. Just as there are no social relations
without conscious entities, so, in the same way entities which are aware
of their concurrent positions will not create a society – even of the lowest
ontological rank, the interaction – if any activities initiated by both correlates
are not justified by the same reason. In general, there is no society without
supreme reason – in this case defined as supreme good – that justifies all the
activities of its entities. If, in other words, entities do not share the desire to
establish social relations because they desire the same values for themselves,
then there is no structured society. There is no society without truth. This
was justified by Sorokin in his theory of the super-system, “and that means
that society is not the existence of thousands of different ways of life, but that
systems of supra-local values hide behind this multiplicity, which have to be
taken into account if one wants to understand the dynamics of cultures, and
world history” [6, p. 726].
There is something in all of this. Indeed human individuals – independently
of each other – can gather as a group, without any reason, but at the same
time, if they do not establish mutual relationships, they do not form any
social structure. “Shapeless” they can acquire knowledge of some reason that
would unite them if only for a moment. And isn’t there a common expression:
“shapeless mass”? For as long as they do not themselves try to understand
the reasons justifying the need for integration, the group will not turn into a
community, that is a basic structure composed of at least interactive social
relations, the simplest possible being. A good example of this is a recent
situation in the port of Calais, where a crowd of refugees made their way en
mass towards the ferry, all, of course, with the same intention which was known
to each one of them independently. Simple interactive relations between a
possible leader-usurper and the rest of a crowd give a reason to mass activity.
That was enough for a formless mob to obtain a short-term form, an elementary
social structure with the shape of a figure and not a “geometrical solid”.
4. For a sociologist what society, as a reality created by sentient beings, is, is not
a problem because it is a network of relationships created by self-correlating
“objects”, which also gives particular meaning to these relationships.
Therefore, for a sociologist, ontological structuralism, according to which
only relationships which come to this reality under investigation and nothing
more, is not a problem. As a kind of reductionism it would be a cognitive
concession, if not a surrender since it is known from the sociology of humanistic
coefficient, that society cannot be reduced (with a metaphysical spell) solely to
social relations. Thus, ultimately it should be considered as formal education,
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which becomes a comparative study of “figures” or “geometrical shapes”,
omitting the subjects of relational references and reasons triggering their
active pursuit of accomplishing the desired good (ratio boni).

metaphysics and the sociology of social
relations 



Let us recall the fact that when one object refers to another object, exerting
influence on it, this is a relationship. Let us also remember that if the relationship
is to exist, both a subject and the end of the relationship (subiectum and
terminus) are required, as well as the basis for the relationship (fundamentum).
This is understood as “the reason, the cause to which an entity refers to the
end” [5, p. 127]. The relationship, as the reference of one object to another,
i.e. one subject to another conscious subject, gains the ontological status of
an accidental event (accidens). As is known, each chance event does not exist
independently, but as a being inherent in the essential being, it obtains its
reality through personal correlates, which consciously express a striving to
co-existence according to the principle of active co-operation.
The structure of society can obviously be explored by using the abstraction, a
method that extracts from its ontic deposits only those realities that may be
perceived outside the subject – without its participation. As an analogy, we
might get to know to know “city life” or even multiple clusters of habitation
from a height so distant that the social reality is only observable in photographs
as communication routes, where its users are not visible. When one chooses
such an observational “bird’s eye view” method to get to know a society, it
cannot be said that a person cannot be seen, only the systems of roads where
someone is undoubtedly moving with a particular purpose. It cannot be said
that this imaging is cognitively useless, because it does not represent society.
But equally it cannot be said that such imaging of a population exhausts the
content of its acquisition and that communication routes are all that the
society as a whole is composed of. When the writers responsible for some
excellent war media coverage portrayed battlefields from space (literally, from
a height of several dozen kilometres), they did not argue that the object of their
knowledge exhausted the content of the message. Indeed thanks to computer
zooming technology they went from the high-ceiling overview to “ground”
imaging, which revealed the faces and actions of the actors in war events.
They behaved exactly as sociologists, who take some ontological level as their
object of cognition, from which (without losing sight of the social whole) they
take out nomothetic generalisations of the relevant range of reality. They do
not say that the truth about the parts removed from the whole entitles them
to apply their conclusions to the whole of social reality, but as they are aware
of the risks of falsehood contained in the rule of pars pro toto, they limit their
reasoning to the frames of the subject of research. So they bring into sociology
their bit of creative thinking; nevertheless, they do not think that the cognitive
reality they had brought in is all that sociology can afford. A sociologist is
allowed to create a theory of social structure, when the object of the cognition
of society is reduced merely to social relations which are the relative reference
of beings to each other and exist extremely realistically as their accidens. At
the same time, he deliberately ignores its simpler and most elementary ontic
components. By restricting himself to the highest level of abstract cognition, he
will not go so far in his process of purifying the “communication framework” of
www.balticsportscience.com
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society, led by an obsession with ontological formalism (on the way to acquiring
knowledge of pure forms), and lose orientation as to the justifying reasons for
this framework. If he did not take this – a principle establishing not only the
structure, but also each component of the ontological society – into account he
could not pass judgement on its cultural identity and membership of the given
social structure to the owner of a normative system. This would particularly
be the case if that collective owner of the field of thought about himself,
eulogised the ideal: the moral (humanistic, anti-humanistic, ahumanistic),
political (monarchist-conservative, conservative-republican, democraticliberal, socialist, imperialist, militarist), economic (capitalist, globalist, fiscal)
or religious (personalistic, fundamentalist, atheistic) or other, in any ideological
and normative form.
What is more, the sociologist would not be able to explain the causes of intrastructural variations or the origin of differences between structures which
undoubtedly result from society adopting the idea of good and normative
standards which determine the exact course of action. It is as if a cartographer,
in drawing up the geopolitical outline of a state’s societies while satisfied with
the accuracy of the resulting form, omitted its colour which symbolises the
values recognised by society and is contained in its perfect culture. Such a map
of the political entities of societies would not have any orientation value. Its
user would not be able to determine which ideological space of the “visited”
social structure he is living in.
Returning to the example of learning about society from “a bird’s eye view”,
this is a way of getting to know it, let’s call it disregarding specific features of a
subjective battlefield. This delivers amazingly new and unknown observational
data, both scientific and empirical in character, and not just pragmatic and
useful in devising a strategy of war. The conclusion may be drawn that only
at a sufficiently high level of abstraction towards the ultra-fine ontic particles
of social reality (appropriate to the knowledge-acquiring subject) that the
details disappear out of sight can the sociologist focus on the relationships
themselves. He can, therefore, omit the following elements: the levels of
movement, behaviour and action of a single entity, and the cooperation
between both two and many interacting ones i.e. the group level; the level of
organisation at which objects reveal their status and roles; and finally, the level
of cultural reality, where agreed patterns of action are located he therefore
sees no movement in these entities in deeds and actions or of cooperation
between two or many entities. He does not observe them in larger groups or
environmental and organizational clusters, striving towards the cultural fields
of awareness; he does not observe, because by this cognition of society he
is not going to penetrate the increasingly complex ontic layers. In getting to
know society the sociologist focuses solely on relationships (communication
routes), i.e. everything that exists between the entities and which – what this
sociologist is familiar with – society as a whole cannot be reduced to.

methodological structuralism 

This way of getting to know society, in which the social relations themselves become
the subject, can be called “methodological structuralism”. This is obviously taken
together with the base (fundamentum), i.e. the rationale for goodness (ratio boni),
justifying their importance, with the exception of any objects of correlations.
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The mere understanding of the relationships between objects as well as
the relationship of the object to itself would have no cognitive value if the
explanation of the cause of the relative incident was omitted. What is more,
to adjudicate on the dependence between relationships, their resulting one
from another or conditioning of one by the other would not be possible without
taking into account the basis of the relationship. In exactly the same way –
figuratively describing the dependence between relationships – main arterial
communication routes gain their validity because they are linked to subroutes and local roads, from which the former (let’s call them the road routes
of “final” destination) originate. No artery, even the most important in the
road network, may be validated if there is no validating of the route which is
subordinate to the middle-ranking relation, and back to the very beginning of
the process of validation, the local relationship. The condition for validating
the main communication artery is validating the relationship of the lowestranking road to the network of all the roads.
If the object refracting the potentiality of a communication relationship is
heading towards the final destination in its activity, then the reason for the
relationship of the lowest rank is the supreme good, which in turn justifies
the succession of relationships: from the lowest and local, through the higher
relationship of the middle-ranking right up to itself, as the relationship of the
final level. This is due to the fact that the local communication relationship
does not justify itself through its own reasons. In the same way, the motorway
relationship which the entity initiates by its activity (by going from a lower
relationship to a higher one) objectifies itself ontologically as much as the
communication community eventually gives it an appetitive status of its own.
A community locates the demand for a final rationale in its normative culture,
in the formula of the idea of the supreme good. It can be said then that the
communication relationships form a network whose rationale is the supreme
good recognized by the objects validating this as the most desirable being
on the way to achieve partial good (bonum partiale). The condition of the
final relationship in the communication network system is the elementary
relationship, the lowest in rank, though indispensable in its fulfilment.
From a logical point of view, the fulfilment of the final communication
relationship can occur without a lower relationship (just as a road map can
only contain descriptions of main routes and omit local roads), but in the order
of things, the lower relationship is a prerequisite for higher relationships.
Although the route is not on the map, it must in fact exist. The arterial
relationship cannot validate itself, though its meaning is justified by the
highest reason (there is no motorway without access roads). And vice versa,
despite the fact that a local relationship can be updated solely for itself, the
full meaning of its destination is complex, “far” beyond it, in the reason of
the supreme good. If the local relationship is not integrated into the higher
relationships, leading to the acquisition of the horizon of medium-range reason,
it will remain a relationship without any sense. The locality of life then will
be based on “experiencing” physical life. When physical life “for itself” is the
only real relationship, then this senseless relationship is not preceded by a
relationship of corporal asceticism. This is certainly the only relationship in
a potentially hierarchical social structure, in which corporal asceticism – if
it presumptively preceded a relationship of physical life “for itself” – would
be a total nonsense. As the relationship of asceticism gains its full meaning
www.balticsportscience.com
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when it is justified by reasons of personal moral dignity – as the highest
reason in social life – so does it become a completely pointless relationship,
when the relationships of social life cease, and the only validation is obtained
by the relationship of physical life “for itself”. In this logical exercise that I
have imposed on myself one thing obsessively comes to my mind. It is the
character of a rural Hamlet who “forms” a relationship with his physicality
to “use” its corporeality1. When the structure of being of this amateur actor
is integrated into the relationship for its own sake, it makes no sense. The
amateur actor, who establishes a relationship only with his physicality, is
nothing but an Uroboros monster, which as a sign of its boundless stupidity
(at least for intellectual simpletons), feeds itself by devouring itself, starting
the “feast” with its own tail.

bodily asceticism as the rationale
for the lowest rank 



This approach to social relations as a network of relationships, creating a
hierarchical social structure, will allow us to understand the importance of
the social relations of bodily asceticism, which is the most “local” relationship
and can even be reduced to an intra-entity self-referential relations (described
by some people as a relationship “for oneself”). At the same time this
meaning is incomprehensible if it is considered as the relationship itself, i.e.
independent of all other social relations. It would also be equivalent to the
silent anthropological assumption – burdened with the error of naturalism –
of the possibility of living for oneself, for one’s own bodily nature with the
possible, therefore not imperative, tying of the “thread of agreement” with
society. The possibility of being “tethered” to another entity is ontologically
impossible, just as it is impossible for an individual to make a naturalistic
escape from society. The entity cannot “alternatively” remain a relational
being, and at the same time be a being forming a relationship exclusively with
itself. To both be and not to be a social entity; man is either a social entity or
does not exist at all. Such an anthropological adjudication is allowed by the
principle of the excluded middle, which states that “something is or is not”
[5, p. 41]. A social subject, which by way of a logical operation “undergoes”
individualisation, becomes a different being: a social person becomes an
individual. The subject must then be considered in a different order of cognition
from the sociological one.
The return to its naturalness is understood as a self-referential relationship
between the subject to its corporeality and, more generally, the return to its
structure of being. This takes into consideration an improvement in various
accidens and becomes meaningful only when it is justified by a higher reason
assigned to a social reason, or indeed, any reason. Examples of social relations
in which two entities may be interested include wealth, parenting or veracity.
If the means of existence is a relationship with another, it has its reason for
good which justifies its meaning. The reasons of wealth, parenting or veracity
give meaning to each of these social relations. So if, despite the ontological
constant (which a relationship is), each of them would be expected to establish
a relationship with the other. By attributing a biotic reason to this inbred
I have in mind a picture by Duda Gracz entitled “Hamlet polny” (Rural Hamlet), which presents a bodily distorted image
of a dirty, obese and exhausted peasant who appears to be asking himself: “to be or not to be”. The artist seems to attribute an existentially momentous thought to this character, placing a skull next to the sitting peasant.
1
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relationship, i.e. bodily “healthiness to enhance healthiness” and “vitality to
enhance vitality,” this inbred non-social relationship could be only justified
by a higher reason.
Relating bodily asceticism as a relationship to itself may not make sense in
itself. It acquires a meaning only when it is recognised jointly by the rationale of
a higher order. In the same way, a stream flowing from the source to the river is
known as a tributary, i.e. it changes its ontological status when it is recognized
in connection with the wider mainstream, flowing into the mainstream of the
river. Then in attempting to understand the relationship between the river’s
currents “from the top”, we can say that the main river current which leads
to its final self-fulfilment at the river’s mouth (or some other final estuary)
provides meaning to the validity of indirect currents, justifying them with its
highest ranking rationale. A similar metaphorical comparison was used by
Tischner in his ethical considerations of the hierarchical relations between
values when he used the example of a cable car while explaining how the
foundations of this vehicle in which its bearing span gains the value of a lower
order owing to the car and the whole cable car has a higher value. The higher
value gives meaning to the importance of the lower value2. The foundations
would not have the status of a lower value were it not for the higher value
which gives it meaning. The foundations as a self-existing object would not
achieve the status of a value on its own.
In general, life as life does not provide meaning to itself even though it is
accompanied by a natural inner rationale. If life is not only about existence
itself, then what value gives it meaning, using the rule of value logic that the
higher value funds the meaning of a lower value? It is worth living for the
sake of living when, in social life, a person exists for another person, as a
maximalist would say. Only then does the moral dignity of a person become
the reason for physical life. It is when asceticism becomes a relationship that
it gains greater importance. It is a paradox that bodily asceticism – the social
relation of the lowest rank – may acquire the highest rank of meaning.
Generally speaking, the importance of every relationship is growing, including
the social relations of asceticism, when personal relations are at the edge
of holiness. Therefore, is it not a true ethically negative assessment of the
relationships of asceticism, whose importance is determined by reasons
of resentment or hatred of the other person as well as the relationship of
depersonalisation of itself, manifested in individualistic selfishness?
In the light of both anti-humanistic and unhumanistic reasons, the social
relations of bodily asceticism at the lowest rank lose their importance and
ultimately become meaningless. And what about the fact that a selfish person
establishes a relationship of asceticism with himself/herself when the only
reason for their life is life for themselves? When life loses its validity, which
the selfish person probably does not realise, and their efforts to enhance their
body size, in some cases to extremes, vitalism or healthism no longer make
sense, and they become absurd.
As Tischner taught, “the value of life is founded on the values which a person
can devote their life to” [7, p. 378-379]. It is only after recognising the logos
Tischner, referring to Scheler, wrote that “higher value is the value funding the lower value”, in the quoted metaphor it
means that “cable car is value that funds/sponsors the stanchion“. [c.f. 7, p. 377].
2
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contained therein, by the intellectual effort of the subject to acquire the
knowledge of their complex moral duty, that physicality obtains social meaning
In other words, the procreative relationship between spouses, and life as life,
is justified by reasons of mutual love, and more generally by personal moral
dignity. Understanding the moral meaning of corporeality must, however, be
preceded by the establishment of a social relationship between a man and
a woman. Going further and getting to know the meaning of moral bodily
asceticism must be preceded by getting to know the validity of educational
activities whose goal is to activate a sense of responsibility for this vital
and procreative bodily formation. Bodily formation as an activity, or bodily
asceticism as a relational being, “is waiting” for its justification, as it cannot
justify itself. As a non-social relationship, justifying the reason for itself – health
for health, and vitality to enhance bodily vitality – it is absurd. If a person
does not exist solely in a relationship, being addicted to the other person, then
whatever he/she does alone may be justified by reason of a social relationship
(a social relationship justifies with its reason non-social relationship) in fact a
higher a relationship, towards the inbred relationship (intrapersonal), which
is the lowest relationship in the ontological order of social structure. Thus
the social relations of bodily asceticism, as a lower-ranking relationship of
being, is always justified by reason of a higher relationship by providing it with
meaning, while the sense of the higher relationship is justified by a reason even
higher in the hierarchy, that is, the idea of good that at the same time justifies
the sense of all other relationships. This creates a social structure which, in a
formal sense, is a hierarchical structure (like a multi-level geometrical solid),
and within normative meaning it must always be recognised as “someone’s”
structure. In this definition the idea of good (always different, and certainly
never the same, nor is the reason of supreme good defined in the same way)
justifies the meaning of all social relationships: relationships of higher and
lower rank which reduce themselves to self-referential beings, and elementary
relationships set up so that the higher relationships which lead to the fulfilment
of the social structure in its cultural ideal find a real ontic anchor in them.
The social structure consists of lower and higher relationships which permeate
into each other. If they are looked at “from below”, this starts with the local and
the lowest, which permeates the higher one in a medium-range of normativity,
right up to the arterial, which has the highest, appetitive rationale. Looked
at “from the top”, the wider relationships spread to the narrower ones, and
their partial rationale gains full power of meaning when it is “illuminated”
by the idea of supreme good. In this regulatory light whose glow radiates
from the ideological top of culture the social relations of bodily asceticism,
despite its lowest rank, gain the status of validity under the same conditions
of necessity, as sui generis, have the tributaries of rivers which flow into
the mainstream. Even the queen of rivers does not grant “grace” to its local
tributaries, and recognising their necessity, because – having self-awareness
of its own existence – it must consider them to be life-giving to it. Even the
smallest river adds to greatness of the queen of rivers.
It is clear from the metaphorical imagining of social structure (as a hierarchical
network of relationships) that the highest rationale justifying the meaning
of the lower relationships, including bodily asceticism, can be freely and
variously determined by ideological leaders. The mistake of ahistoricism in
the sociological exploration of hierarchical social structures would be the view
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regarding the possibility of obtaining the full logical truth about them, with
a metaphysical assumption denying the fact that social reality is causal-andideological, not only causal, that is only explored nomothetically. A sociologist
cannot deny the fact that the structures are different, and not only formally
exclusively, so that the social relations of bodily asceticism, regardless of the
structure into which it is incorporated, gains a different status of meaning every
time and takes on another meaning. Indeed, the relationships of asceticism
always obtain the same, the lowest rank, which in every social reality remains
only a “local road”. However, each time it is justified by reasons of good
appropriate to this structure, the locality in which it is included, changes. For
example, a local road to a church symbolises a relationship towards deification,
whereas the local road to a death camp leads to the humiliation of the dignity
of the person; both roads are included in radically different meanings of the
social relations of asceticism.
Another issue is whether a sociologist, who is expected to assume the position
of a theorist by using the inductive method to recognise the causality of social
relations, has the power to evaluate the ideological content of social structures.
Or in other words, can a sociologist, who perceives differences between the
reasons for the main social structures assess the superiority of one over all
the rest. After all, the reasons which are their prime fundamentum cannot be
equal to each other. In other words, can they express judgements about the
good itself, and as a result replace them with related theoretical judgements?
Can a sociologist “switch” his knowledge of the social structures of theoretical
rationality to normative rationality, and thus enter into the role of a philosopher
of values, a philosopher of society and a philosopher of culture?
As it is known, sociologists have been asking themselves for a long time
“whether they should also hold philosophical values?” [8, p. 460], because they
are aware that not only an extraordinary diversity of values can be found in
the world. “As a result, every sociologist who decides to apply their knowledge
to solving a specific problem is, willy-nilly, involved in a dispute over values
and norms” [8, p. 462].
So when the sociologist discovers that social structures, despite formal
similarity, are different in ideological content the process of their evaluation
must be initiated, in particular those that affirm the desirability of their goods
as the supreme reason. In this light all the relationships of this structure,
including the social relations of bodily asceticism, take on the same meaning.
If, however, he refuses to express his opinion about the good, as the guardian
of the purity of his methodological study, he would still be unable to deny that
good along with desirability rests in action and he would have to “adopt a
certain metaphysical minimum related to the question of the good” [9, p. 98]3.
In the search for differences between world societies sociologists and
philosophers “are agreed on the fundamental issue”. As Znaniecki wrote, “the
highest values are the values that have positive significance for all mankind”
[10, p. 500]. Leaving aside the question of “refraining oneself from issuing value
and normative judgements” by sociologists (as methodologically important in
itself) – they would not escape inquiries about cultural universalism, contained
R. Masarczyk wrote in her critical commentary on Ossowska’s sociology of morality: “she left out in a planned manner
[judgments about the good – A.P.], claiming that the question of the absoluteness of the good is a matter of faith, not a
matter of science” [c.f. 9, p. 98].
3

www.balticsportscience.com

138

Baltic Journal of Health and Physical Activity 2017;9(2):128-148
Journal of Gdansk University of Physical Education and Sport in Gdansk
e-ISSN 2080-9999

in the humanistic truths of the ideal, or moral relativism sustained by other
cultures, or depressive natural national-conservative social structure – in other
words, politically correct authoritarianism. In search of differences between
super-systems and their cultures, which were designed to evaluate the good
contained in them, moralising sociologists, or social philosophers, (including
philosophers of values and philosophers of culture) use the results of their
scientific exploration to elevate some, as the better ones by applying universal
humanistic tests and by recognising the worse ones. The better ones are those
which, generally speaking, prioritise the good of human beings over impersonal
beings, or, by liberating man to freedom without limits, condemn him to
solitude. Despite logically irrefutable evidence contained in the judgements
of society-culture, philosophers have not escaped accusations of moralising.
It is as if the judges assessing the moral evil of the genocidal actions of war
criminals during the Nuremberg trials were accused of errors in normative
reasoning, even though all the judges knew from which source of the truth
about the supreme good they were taking orders from, in order to formulate
their conclusions infallibly. So when a sociologist is involved in a dispute
over values, while facing a homicidal super-system of authoritarianism of
communism on the one hand, and a super-system of national-conservative
democratism on the other (incidentally, destroyed by the first one), they cannot
settle for the inductive exploration of the explanation of the causality of both.
If they only want to do more for the truth about cultural TRUTH, they have
the right to deliver equally serious scientific judgements about good and evil,
deductively derived from the axiomatic premises of some supreme law of
ethics. Obviously, even if were accused of “falling out of the role of an objective
researcher describing different value systems and different ‘truths’, irreducible
to one another, while occupying the position of a moralist who judges which
of these systems is better and where the Truth written with a capital letter
is” [6, p. 727], the truth would in a strictly scientific sense still be on his side,
when he revealed that some social super-systems were deadly structures to
those of a different race or class, whereas others contain the social relations
of the affirmation of life. At the same time he must recognise the differences
between bodily asceticism justified by reason of hatred towards strangers,
and – at the opposite pole of ethical judgement asceticism – justified by the
good of life for personal dignity.
In general, the sociologist must see the difference between a super-system
which takes into account the demand for humanistic ideals and the primacy of
man over society, and a super-system ranking an impersonal being as a supreme
one. This is generally utopian and theoretically invalid, and therefore imaginary,
and unattainable in light of the principle of causality. By this its priority to
man or yet another super-system is assumed, in which the external freedom
of the individual is the absolute good, achievable through the objectification of
society. It thus postulates the freedom of expression of an individual’s actions
for themselves, based on the principle of getting rid of responsibility for another
individual, who is also free in their individualistic actions. The first of the supersystems “for the development of man as a person” may be called humanistic,
the second “against the person” known as anti-humanistic, and the third, with
its characteristic horizontal structure “next to the person,” unhumanistic.
Almost every sociologist has written about an authoritarian super-system, but
when it comes to identifying a “better” super-system that would include the
truth “with a human face” in its culture then the very act of praising it was
www.balticsportscience.com

139

Pawłucki A.
The place of bodily asceticism in a nation’s social structure
Balt J Health Phys Act 2017;9(2):128-148

negatively judged by other scholars as falling out of the role, or more scornfully
– moralising. A Bolshevik intellectual – Sorokin, experienced this at one
point when he dared to elevate the ideational (thoroughly humanistic) supersystem above other super-systems, and to judge the sensate super-system
(ahumanistic, strongly unhumanistic) – critically. Indeed he prophetically
foresaw the collapse of the liberal ideal, and called this super-system of
hedonism and moral relativism “the villain of historical drama” [6, p. 727],
long before the explosion of excitement about liberal philosophy, which valued
the super-system of liberal democracy above all others. Hardly anyone noticed
the conceptual absurdity included in it (negative freedom as an artefact). And
only a few sociologists – those heading towards social philosophy – recognized
hidden relations of tyranny (soft authoritarianism) in its structure. This was
proved by Roger Scruton [11] and by Ryszard Legutko [12], who clearly
laid out the weakness of the liberal ideal. Florian Znaniecki also negatively
assessed the communist super-system, and, as one of the very few sociologists
of explicitly philosophical disposition, he stated that there should be “a
worldwide continuity of the development of new, culturally creative human
personalities”. He probably did not care about being accused of falling out
of the role, which is can be confirmed by the significant subtitle The Decline
of Western Civilization. A Sketch from the Interface of Cultural Philosophy
and Sociology [13]. Similarly, in a subsequent sociological treatise, Modern
Nationalities, he includes philosophical considerations about the unity of the
world. In his criticism of ochlocracy, racial imperialism, Bolshevism and the
materialism of Western society he preceded even Sorokin. However, he was not
naive. While presenting the philosophical concepts of the unity of the world,
he expressed the view that a transnational world culture “has not been, and
never will be, fully, definitely formed”, and he did not share the expectations
of those social philosophers who believed that “the future history of humanity
will go towards the creation of a common secular culture (“civilisation”) and
a politically-united global society” [13, p. 251, 252].
Both men critically evaluated Bolshevism and communism, as each recognised,
in his own way, the ontology of humanistic pretence4 contained in them: a
super-system with an inhuman face which pretended to serve an individual,
whereas in fact, it reduced the individual to the level of a “fertilizer of history”.
In light of the theory of social structure, the super-system of enslavement
took on a vertical shape, while authoritarian coercion was the relationships
causing a state of absolute dependence in every lower-rank relationship. Bodily
asceticism, as the lowest-ranked social relation in the social structure, was
consistently included in the political structure, and became part of the rationale
of statehood. Asceticism took on the meaning of citizenship, and from that
time on, was induced “top-down” with constant rigour by central government
and “bottom-up”– through terror by local authorities. The same meaning was
adopted by the school of asceticism, which was directly subordinate to the
structure of the appointed office of physical culture and, indirectly, to the
structure of the party and state. It was, in fact, included in the network of direct
relationships between politics and partisanship; it was entirely permeated
with the rationale of revolutionary citizenship.

4

The notion of ontology of humanistic pretence was used by Jadwiga Staniszkis [c.f. 15].
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bodily asceticism and national ideals



Where methodological structuralism is concerned, i.e. the method of
exploring society – reduced exclusively analytically to a network of relations
– then first and foremost, we must consider society as the whole of global
humanity, “the whole human race”, involving a “transnational world culture”.
Secondly, we must consider nationally-specific societies, in which bodily
asceticism is always justified by the rationale of the highest ideals of “national
unification, national progress, national mission and national independence as
declared by national thinkers” [6]5.
The inclusion of bodily asceticism in the world’s social structures (i.e. a reality
for all the nations of the world), which is generally referred to as healthiness,
took place through the intervention of the intellectual leaders of “healthiness
international” which included ethicists, educators, sociologists, psychologists
and doctors. Through their social networks of influence they justified the
reasons for a health asceticism (or more generally speaking, the reason for
the quality of life), with their good personal, public and professional. They
then started to introduce it to the educational structure of health asceticism
which was created from scratch. They, therefore, incorporated their national
health educational structure into the structure of international healthiness,
which praised the existential reason for the asceticism of healthiness all over
the world, wherever such a “structure in the structure” was to be created
(under the name “network of health-promoting schools”)6. The international
asceticism of healthiness reinforces the resonance of its ideal – the quality of
life – thanks to the ideal of quality of earthly life, which is now expressed more
and more loudly. This ideal of earthly life is ranked higher than the reason
of healthiness for the quality of social life, i.e. the ideal of the vitality of the
species for the quality of life in the global community7.
At a national level of learning about society, to which the issue of social
structures refers, all the relationships that are fundamental to the suitable
ideal – adopted because of an intellectual leader – are preceded by bodily
asceticism. This is a necessary relationship and comes about in every case
directly from the national ideologue. They not only initiate its validity, at the
level of management structures, but, more importantly, “post on the net” the
ideological justification of its rationale. This originally comes from the fact that
the leader of a nation, just as the father of a family – acting on the principle
of leadership, not authority8 – is guided by a sense of responsibility for the
intergenerational continuity of the life of the cultural community, and obviously
for its present-day existential success. He includes in the structure of the
national network of gymnasion, relationships from the academic and scientific,
and pedagogical and educational fields, and between a teacher and a student,
to arouse the spirit of bodily asceticism. This leads to the intensification
of healthiness and vitality (including reproduction), and when the need of
history is pressing – to improved combat efficiency. In the public and national
network of health asceticism, first place always goes to the intellectual leader
These ideals were distinguished by Znaniecki, although in the treaty “Modern nationalities” he was not consistent while
considering the basis on which the organisation of the nation. Jerzy Szacki writes about it in the introduction to the works
of Znaniecki; Z. Znaniecki, Współczesne…, p. XVII.
5

Out of necessity, I have to omit the story of the worldwide movement for healthiness and the history of health education and,
more broadly, the history of public health, contained in it. Its textbook version was presented by Barbara Woynarowska [c.f.
16]. The World Health Organization (WHO) most accurately reflects the name of the structure of international healthiness.
6

The last climate summit, which took place in Paris (2015), gathered the leading representatives of all state communities of the world. In this way, it confirmed the update of the universal social structure, bearing the idea of cosmic vitality.
7

8

Znaniecki distinguished these two principles [c.f. 14].
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of the super-system that includes in academic, expert and decision-making
relationships in the general social network. However, in a situation where the
social structure of physical culture does not yet exist, it begins to create it
from the beginning, by establishing expert and advisory relationships9. The
structure of every national society contains inclusive structures of bodily
asceticism, as its inalienable particle, which funds the national total fulfilment
towards the ideal, and which also provides the lowest in the hierarchy of
networks with justification of its fullest meaning. In a miniature version,
reduced to the social structure of the family, bodily asceticism is validated
by linking this relationship to the ideal, analogous to national unification,
namely the unification of the community on the basis of the reciprocity of
selfless service. This is manifested most fully in one person’s social relations
with other people.

bodily asceticism in a country ’ s social structure
The system of bodily asceticism obviously does not include itself in the social
structure of a nation. It should be remembered that this network is a relational
being and owes its inclusive location in the larger social structure to the
entity of a higher rank. As this is an appetitive factor of leadership – as in
the case of a nation – it can give the network a certain legitimate ideological
topicality. The leader of a nation shows both prudence, when the network of
bodily asceticism is updated, and also wisdom, when its meaning justifies a
period of prosperity in the community’s well-being.
In the case of the appetitive factor in the political power of the state, updating
the social structure of physical education is by no means certain or obvious.
In particular, it is not clear if the head of state does indeed intend to serve the
nation if they are guided by selfishness. A selfish ruler relinquishes responsibility
for the life of the nation and puts up with its ideals through silencing discourse
on values or by giving them discretionary meaning. At the same time, he
encourages others to replace the morally charged promise of life for another
person with an “oath” of living for oneself to overcome the social relations of
community to marriage and parenthood. Thus, in the long term – defined as the
ancestral and national – and through the adoption of a relationship towards the
self and in the individualistic freedom of a socially-isolated single, a final version
of discretionary self-determination – the individual citizen is deprived of a sense
of national belonging. A political ruler who thinks only about his own wellbeing and who joins in the establishment’s network of collective selfishness (as
happens in liberal-democratic tyrannies), is not morally empowered to arouse
in himself responsibility for the public good and to accept the national ideal as
the only right political structure even though he may feel pricks of conscience.
One excludes the other. It is, therefore, no wonder that in the political structure
of the tyranny of collective selfishness the social relations of concern about the
biotic status of the nation do not appear. This is characteristic of the structure
of a cratocracy (the “power for the ruler”), where the establishment plays a
cynical game with the orphaned society of apparent concern for public health10.
A good example of establishing a national system of bodily asceticism from the beginning can be the social structure of
physical culture created by the Head of State Jozef Pilsudski, which in the first phase of its validation was justified with
the ideal of national independence. When the experts did not fulfil the expectations of Pilsudski (1927), he started himself
to establish the crucial relations, which led to the formation of a national system of military asceticism (Central Institute
of Physical Education was created between 1925 and 1929).
9

10 Cratocracy as a degenerate form of government was described by Krzysztof Szczerski. [c.f. 17].
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By rejecting the national ideal, in this way the ruler moves away from
responsibility for updating the social structures of physical culture, of
medical culture, of the culture of living and the culture of dying, which the
community depends on. In the politics of life that he establishes he confers
on each individual the responsibility of updating their own asceticism of
healthiness, and enables them to select their own interpretation from the
field of meanings. The ruler does not care about the kind of structure of being
that others create. The ruler does not care whether people establish social
relations with each other to confirm their identity in the next generation. For
an authority immersed in an individualistic selfishness and wandering in the
wilderness of moral relativism, national well-being may no longer exist. Since
everything is allowed, the social structure of the nation can be “dissolved”,
and the hanging “loose ends” of meaningless relationships can be grafted as
hybrids to the network of Europeanism.

bodily asceticism within the structure of the
family community 
In a miniature version of national society, which can be reduced to the family
structure, bodily asceticism is refreshed by linking this relationship with the
ideal analogous to national unification, in other words, community unification.
This is carried out according to the principles of mutual voluntary service,
which are manifested most fully in the relationship of one person living for
another person. As in any other social structure, the social relations of rationale
for asceticism are instigated within the family networks of an intellectual
leader. It is never initiated by itself, because, as with the previously-discussed
accidens, it enters the experience of participants within the community thanks
to a moderator. Although a family structure “emerges” from the network of
natural structures – which the logos of physical significance is a part of –
it is manifested in the sexual differentiation of femininity and masculinity.
However, the desire to maintain the diversity of this ontological structure
– which conditions social life – is preceded by the acquisition of deductive
knowledge of both its metaphysical and ethical codes. As this is a hermetically
coded structure of being, it can be said bluntly that, nomen omen, not every
head of a family is able to recognize their “expectations” on the basis of
reading the sense contained therein. Similarly, not every “head”, i.e. person
asks himself questions about the meaning of the physical universe, which
is, perhaps, encoded in its mathematical structures11. Perhaps because not
everyone is granted the ability to get to know the meaning, the status of head
of the family is given only to intellectually-empowered elders, who exceed the
knowledge of others, but who are also capable of bravely adopting naturalistic
metaphysical assumptions about Rationality “inherent” in bodily nature [18]. Is
this not the naturalistic assumption Kołakowski had in mind, when he deduced,
as did most philosophers who followed the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas –
who saw moral reasons in bodily structure – that in order to recognise natural
law “one needs faith in something that can be called the constitution of a moral
being, besides physical constitution, and that the constitution coincides with
the rule of Reason in the world” [19, p. 222].
There is a reason why I am quoting here a philosophical treatise by Michal Heller, evocatively titled “The meaning of life
and the meaning of the universe”, Biblos, Tarnów 2002, in which the author recognises that “in the environment of Sense
life is worth living” [1, p. 208]; however, to reach such a conclusion owing to one’s deductive thinking, one needs to equip
themselves with a tool and later use it to gain cosmological and theological knowledge. Thus the mystery of Meaning is given only to the one who looks for it. Not every head of the family can get to know the meaning of corporeality, and certainly
not the head that does not even think that the meaning of ontological structure of being can be applied to the living body.
11
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The complexities of logic do not so much identify the weaknesses of knowledge,
but rather point to the complexity of the metaphysical social relations of logos
– in the double sense of: mathematical Rationality and ethical wisdom – with
bodily nature. Despite these complexities this is really about granting to the
pure and practical human mind the ability to: 1) identify mathematical logos,
“providing” our pure cognition with the idea of the perfection of the bodily
structure (what the perfection of the body is all about), and 2) the logos of
ethics, which directs practical cognition towards responsibility for the active
affirmation of bodily nature (the fulfilment of obligations which are expected
from human bodily nature).
Pure reason which allows insight into the mathematical logos and which
decides about the perfection of bodily nature leads to the conclusion that
there would not be family as a primary inter-subject correlation if in the
natural order human beings were not ontically, within the structure of being,
essentially diversified according to bodily gender. This has the characteristics
of bilateral mutual relationships (relatio mutua) and also manifests itself as a
symmetrical structure of kinship, obviously including relationships with the
offspring and the elders of both parties. Indeed, there would not be any social
structures (not only family structures), if the structure of human beings were
not “reasoned” by the preceding mathematical structure. This is the logos of
bodily structure, in two equally dignified entities: a woman in relation to a
man and a man in relation to a woman. These entities are different in their
essence, but remain complementary relational elements: of masculinity for
femininity and femininity for masculinity. If it were not for the logos of bodily
gender, expressed by the invisible mathematical structure, society (as we know
it) would not be possible. And further, while considering the bodily condition
of the family social structure a revelation takes place which recognises that
“some” normative message is contained in corporeality, not just in its sexuality.
Given the practical rationality of the head of the family, it may be said that
the formulation of obligations to bodily nature known as natural law “is not
an abstraction or any text to read and quote randomly by some casuists. It
is just Reason in operation” [20, p. 195]. In fact, one has to work hard to
reach the encoded message; the inquiring subject may call it natural law,
but the subject can also conclude that bodily nature holds wisdom which is
synonymous with the logos of ethics. Bodily nature is the first source of laws
outlining the elementary principles of “dealing with” bodily nature, and the
resulting opinions concern the obligation of moral conduct to bodily nature.
Therefore, are the two logos not the first principle of the physical universe,
and thus the constituent cause of perfection in human bodily nature?12. So,
just like those people who “can be cognised”, and indeed, “processed” from
metaphysical truths to logical truths and “allowed” to enter the practical
reasoning of the head of the family and the supreme head of the national
thinker’s family of families, he would commit himself to produce a network
affirming bodily life, guided by a desire for the welfare for his own people.
He would also seek to establish a relationship with bodily asceticism within
this network, one that favoured imbuing the family structure with a moral
ideal, since he would make the social relations leading to it really fortunate.
M. Heller wrote that man intended by God is equipped with rationale in two meanings. In this meaning, two elements
must be placed: a rational “plan”, i.e. assigning man a place in the whole work of creation, and the element of “evaluation/
recognition”, i.e. to treat an individual human being as a value from the very beginning. […] Every man should recognise
their own meaning and realise it”, because he is a self-aware being, and therefore able to get to know the meaning of the
Universe, by exploring their meaning of life” [c.f. 21, p. 195].
12
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Natural law leads the head of the family to understand that gender structure
becomes the source of a person’s life in their body. On the other hand, however,
self-ownership in a living body becomes the condition of community life owing
to the fact that bodily accidens help undertake actions directed to oneself and
for one’s own sake, and indeed creates, just by its relationality, the family
community of people. The movement of the body is a prerequisite for personal
action. This means that no social act would have been possible if natural bodily
accidens – triggered by willpower and initially induced by desire for one’s
own well-being – were not contained in the human physical structure. This is
a crucial moment in the labyrinth of meaning in which not only the head of
the family but also their parents who begin to understand that if “any calling
becomes the essence of their coexistence” [22, p. 90], in the network of any
social relations, bodily asceticism should be given the status of indispensable
actuality as a relationship supporting the entire social structure. Moreover, it
is also important to establish this for the intergenerational future of the family
community. Children incorporated into social relations of asceticism will have
learnt the moral meaning of it by the time they are intellectually mature. Within
the family network of asceticism they become active for fun, not realizing that
the highest reason for health and leisure hedonism will for them be the love of
a spouse, and then of parental love. In the structure of the family community,
bodily asceticism is recognised as a lower ranking moral obligation. As the
indispensable interpersonal lowest rank relationship, in relation to all social
relationships within the structure of the family, it receives the highest rank
of meaning, as it is justified by the good of love.

conclusions 

1. Every social relationship is logically preceded by the social relations of
bodily asceticism, the structure of social physical culture lies at the ontological
“base” of every social structure. It lies there inclusively, as a relational being
of the lowest rank, of varying importance, according to the ideal standing at
the top of social structure, which expresses a desire for the supreme good.
2. Bodily asceticism as a relationship of the lowest rank in the whole network
of social structures has meaning justified by the rationale of the ideal –
the supreme good: this kind of ideal influences reason which justifies the
relationship of bodily asceticism to it.
3. The social relations of bodily asceticism do not justify its meaning. When
it is a relationship for itself, it loses its importance (colloquially, it becomes
absurd). We should remember that bodily asceticism is an inbred relationship,
with a self-referential vector, and so as a relationship, it is extremely asocial
[23]. Updating itself for itself is an ontological unlikelihood, as unlikely (in the
meaning of metaphysical falsehood) as is a human as a socially-isolated being.
Man as a non-social being does not exist. By nature, man is a social being,
so he exists only relationally. If, therefore, as a fully socially-incorporated
being, he fell into a state of inbred relationality of their own free will – they
would cease to be the essence of what they are. If they solely fell into bodily
asceticism, then they would not find a reason justifying its meaning. There is
also the fact that by being outside social structure, (on the principle of “falling
out” of its network) they would lose their sense of being.
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By joining the social structure, they can justify the importance of each
relationship and thus also the social relations of bodily asceticism.
4. The social relations of bodily asceticism, even though it is a being of the
lowest rank in the whole network of the social structure, gains importance
because the reason that justifies it is the highest good. It does not mean that
this fact gives it its full meaning. By speaking of the full meaning of the social
relations of bodily asceticism, I mean its justification of the reason for the
good of a person’s moral dignity – the supreme good, “brushing against” the
holiness in humanity. Judgement in respect of the moral dignity of a person,
which implicitly implies moral good over other good, is derived by deduction
from the elementary principles of natural law. The reason for bodily asceticism
may be an impersonal or individual ideal, giving priority to the moral value of
existence over an existence morally related to the detachment of an individual’s
humanity. So the fundamentum of the social structure can be an ideal which
is freely practised.
5. While contrasting the ideal of a person versus an impersonal or counterpersonal one, we point to the possibility of its gradation, from the ideal
proclaiming the creative development of the individual for themselves (in
a relationship of person to person) to a subjective, non-personalised and
individualistic (depersonalising), or impersonal and collectivist (degrading
person) ideal. When bodily asceticism is justified by reason of an individualistic
or collectivist ideal, then, despite the highest formal level of desirability of
good which justifies the whole social structure, its meaning (humanistic) not
only decreases but even totally loses its humanistic importance (colloquially,
it becomes absurd).
6. Asceticism is a necessary intra-personal social interaction in respect of all
social relations, except for those lead by a spiritual life, which assumes the
negation of temporal life, and hence, of bodily life. In those circumstances
bodily asceticism repressed by spiritual asceticism is transformed into a
relationship of anti-asceticism – as related to the self-destruction of the ontic
structure. This social relation of anti-corporeality is not the only one that
“ruins” the entire social structure. Every other relationship contributes to the
abolition or deconstruction of all social relationships that precede the social
change, which lead from the affirmation of temporality to its negation.
7. In the social network, bodily asceticism is a potentiality. Its ontological
constancy is expressed by the fact that it potentially lies within every social
structure. Breaking the relationship for the sake of its validation happens when
it is thought about or considered, whereas the state of activation is linked with
the liberation of the desire to fulfil its meaning. Bodily asceticism is related to
internal causality. It is performed “externally”, directed at its reality when its
potential is broken down, first by thinking and then by appetitive desire. This
is exactly as is in the case of quantum reality, where the potential becomes
the state of reality, as a result of being tracked by the observer as a cognitive
subject. The dependence of the social relations of the state of bodily asceticism
on internal causality, and more specifically the top causality, in which the
consciousness of the reflective subject elicits its locality, shows that in the
timeless dimension, this relationship lies within the social structure in a state
of potentiality (“awaiting” the observer who will turn it into reality). Even more
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specifically, when we consider social structure in relation to the super-system
of national society – then the whole social structure of bodily asceticism is
inherently conveyed in the super-system as its “possibility”.
8. The principle of top-bottom causality, which determines the importance of
the processes of a quantum brain [3, p. 28], allows us to understand why, along
with the modernisation of the liberal-democratic state structure, the structure
of bodily asceticism developed in the earlier structures of the authoritarian
state, has been abolished. The state structure of physical culture ceased to
exist when the ideologist, in the wake of the new idea, led it consciously to
liquidation and unconsciously transferred it to a state of potentiality. I do not
rule out the idea that the system of bodily asceticism will in fact be “thrown
back” into the structure of the super-system of national society.
However, a quantum leap in the field of consciousness of the national ideologist
would be needed. This, after initiating social causality, would lead it out of the
state of non-locality and potentiality to the locality, the “place” awaiting it,
which would justify its reason with a new ideal, most likely the ideal of national
independence. A leader simply concerned with cultural heritage would be
needed, one who would recognise that the intensification of the spirit of the
new ideal depended on a “connection” to all the social relationships of the
system of bodily asceticism – a network powered by the scientific mind of the
community of national gymnasion.
9. The “awakening” of the system of bodily asceticism from a state of nonlocal vigilance “everywhere and nowhere specifically” to local reality has to be
made as a result of a quantum leap in the leader’s thoughts. This awareness
needs to be induced by the top-down causality of both a philosopher and a
physical culture teacher. Despite the blocking of the connectivity of the system
of bodily asceticism from the social structure by cratocracy, which is called
community service a distribution of public resources, academic gymnasions
survived the collapse of the state, or rather – each in their own local way – got
used to the chronic threat to their existence. It is up to the nation’s thinkers
whether the network of academic gymnasions is justified by reason of the
praised ideal, or whether each of them independently – patiently bearing a
hunger for meaning – will excuse themselves with the idealess reason of the
market in physical services. This reason is undoubtedly important for the
private network of fitness clubs, but fails to meet the expectations of the
fraction of the community of scholars who constantly aspire to fulfil public
tasks relevant to the cultural community of the nation.
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